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PREFACE 
Imagery is an important area of study for a number of reasons. 
First, many issues regarding the structure and function of images have 
yet to be clarified. Second, studying the nature of imagery can pro-
vide information on the structure of memory, attention, and other more 
broad aspects of cognitive psychology. Third, understanding the pro-
cesses underlying imagery provides important information concerning how 
people solve practical problems in everyday living. This thesis deals 
with the question of how images are rotated and how a person's mental 
point of reference is transformed. The processes underlying such be-
havior have hopefully received at least some clarification. 
I wish to express my appreciation to Dr. Robert J. Weber, who 
served as my Thesis Adviser, for his continual guidance, encouragement 
and help. Dr. Robert F. Stanners and Dr. William E. Jaynes also served 
as committee members, and I should like to express appreciation and 
thanks to them as well. 
Finally, I would like to thank my wife, DeAnn, for her continual 
encouragement and patience. 
iii 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
Chapter Page 
INTRODUCTION .. 1 
ABSTRACT ..••• 2 
TRANSFORMATION OF THE MIND'S EYE LOCATION AND VISUAL IMAGE ORIEN-
TATION IN PERCEIVING CUTANEOUS DRAWINGS . • • . . 3 
Method . . . . 
Subjects. . 
Procedure . 
Stimuli . 
Results .. 
Discussion 
REFERENCE NOTES • 
REFERENCES .••. 
FIGURE CAPTIONS • 
APPENDIX A - TABLE OF MEANS FOR THE MANKIN AND FIEBIG PILOT 
STUDY •• 
APPENDIX B - MENTAL IMAGES AND MENTAL MAPS. 
APPENDIX C - INSTRUCTIONS • • • . 
APPENDIX D - ANALYSIS OF VARIANCE SUMMARY TABLE 
' iv 
11 
11 
12 
15 
15 
20 
26 
27 
30 
34 
36 
53 
58 
Table 
1. 
LIST OF TABLES 
Mean Reaction Times (msec.) 
Study) . • • • • • • . . . 
(Mankin and Fiebig Pilot 
2. Analysis of Variance Summary Table. 
v 
Page 
35 
59 
LIST OF FIGURES 
Figure Page 
l. Time Course of a Single Trial. • . . • . • . • • • . . • . 31 
2. Mean Reaction Time, Standard Deviations and Error Percen-
tages for Transformation Strategies Across Operations. • 32 
• vi 
INTRODUCTION 
This thesis has been formatted according to Arr.erican Psychological 
Association specifications. The deviation from the Oklahoma State 
University format was used to facilitate publication in the Journal of 
Experimental Psychology. Permission to use this format was granted by 
the Graduate College. 
• 1 
Abstract 
Two strategies for operating on visual images (image transformation and 
mind's eye transformation) were studied in the context of cutaneous per-
ception of drawings on the forehead and left side of the head. ~wenty­
four male and 24 female undergraduates were divided into four balanced 
groups. All subjects received finger drawings of ambiguous letters 
(£,~~~~~) and identified each drawing after performing one of four men-
tal operations. Reaction times and accuracy in identifying the drawings 
from their transformed position were measured. Results showed the image 
transformation strategy both faster and more accurate than the mind's 
eye transformation. In both transformation strategies, more complex 
operations took significantly longer than simple operations, especially 
for the mind's eye strategy. Possible relations between image transfor-
mations and allocation of attention resources are discussed. 
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Transformation of Mind's Eye Location and Visual 
Image Orientation in Perceiving 
Cutaneous Drawings 
There are two broad geometric strategies a person may use when 
asked to change the way he or she views a visual image. One way is to 
hold the mind's eye in one position and rotate the image about some 
axis; x, y, or z. The second way is to transform the location of the 
mind's eye and hold the image "fixed" in~ one place. Although a result 
of each of these strategies may be functionally identical, the processes 
used seem quite different. 
The concept of a 'mind's eye' is best defined as a simile for the 
interpretive processes that extract information from the image buffer. 
These interpretive processes behave as if they are a disembodied eye 
that can (a) move around the mental representation of the environment or 
(b) produce or interpret operations on the image representation. 
Some real world analogs to this phenomenon may be considered. If 
an assembly line worker reaches behind an object to install a part, he 
may mentally visualize what his hand is doing in one of at least two 
ways. First, he may mentally turn the object around so that he visual-
izes its back side, or, second, he may mentally keep the object sta-
tionary and move his mind's eye behind the object. Both strategies are 
functionally identical. That is, the worker uses a visual image of the 
back of the object to aid him in his task. 
3 
4 
An automobile mechanic may experience the same phenomenon. His 
task, though, may be complicated because the mechanic f~equently works 
while leaning over the automobile in an upside down position. The 
mechanic in the upside down position may use one of the two strategies 
mentioned above. If he is upside down and reaching behind an object, he 
may mentally turn the object around and rotate it in the picutre plane 
so that he sees the back side of the object in an upright position with 
respect to his head. In this instance he simply keeps his body coordin-
ates fixed and transforms the image. A functionally equivalent strategy 
would require the mechanic to mentally move his mind's eye to the back-
side of the object then rotate his mind's eye to an upright position 
with respect to gravity. Here, the image remains fixed while the mind's 
eye moves through a coordinate space. 
Two experiments related to this problem were performed by Kolers 
and Perkins (l969a, l969b). Subjects were to identify strings of let-
ters which were transformed in various ways. The four transformation 
operations of interest here were normal appearance (N) , rotation in the 
plane of the page (R) , mirror reflection (M) , and inversion in the depth 
plane (I) . Results showed that identifying letter strings were not 
equally fast or accurate for different operations. In increasing 
latency, the order was N, R, M, I. In increasing error scores, the 
order was N, M, R, I. Differences between M and R in both speed and 
accuracy were slight if not altogether insignificant. Differences on 
both accounts between N and I were highly significant. Kolers and Per-
kins did not discuss in detail whether image transformation or mind's 
eye transformation was employed as the performance strategy. Either 
strategy could have been used. 
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Cooper and Shepard (1973) confirmed that people can transform visual 
images apparently while holding the mind's eye fixed. They tested sub-
jects on the time to rotate mental images different degrees along the 
picture plane. Using alphabetic and numeric figures, Cooper and Shepard 
first presented a stimulus, then after withdrawing it, presented a test 
figure which was either a mirror image or the same orientation of the 
original figure. Subjects were scored on the amount of time it took to 
respond whether the test figure was the same orientation or the mirror 
image of the original figure. Cooper and Shepard used five different 
levels of giving subjects prior information about the direction and 
orientation of the test item. Results from each of those levels of ad-
vanced information indicated that the more information a subject had 
about orientation of the test item, the more diminished were verifica-
tion times. These results were used to support the argument that mental 
rotation of visual images can be verified and analyzed, and that the 
farther one must rotate an image the longer it will take. 
In another experiment, Cooper and Shepard (1975) studied the mental 
transformation of visual images in the depth plane. They used a pro-
cedure in which people were asked to recognize whether a drawing of a 
hand, which was rotated in the depth plane, was a right or a left hand. 
Subjects were first presented with a schematic drawing of a hand. The 
angle of rotation which the test stimulus would assume was cued to the 
subject by a thumbless hand. After the thumbless hand was removed, 
people were timed while deciding if the test hand was right or left. 
The hypothesis was that if people flip a visual image of their own hand 
to help them decide the orientation of the test, then verification times 
will be longer for trials which require transformations in the depth 
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plane. The results seemed to indicate that people can flip visual images 
in the depth plane. 
Images derived from cutaneous drawings may also be used to study 
image transformations. In addition, cutaneous stimulation is a method 
which may be applied to studying the transformation of the mind's eye. 
This method was first described by Krech and Crutchfield (1958). They 
stated that if a figure, like the lower-case letter £ 1 is traced on the 
forehead of a subject it can either be perceived as a E or a ~· If the 
letter is perceived as a ~, then the subject experiences the figure from 
an internal point of view, that is, from a location of the mind's eye in-
side his or her head looking out. If the letter is perceived as a £' 
then the subject views the image of the letter from an external point of 
view: that is, from a location of the mind's eye outside his or her head 
which is similar to the perspective taken by the experimenter. In other 
words, the subject's mind's eye can be in an internal or external loca-
tion with respect to the head. 
Corcoran (1977) studied the location of the mind's eye in identify-
ing figures drawn on the skin. Assymetrical figures were drawn on the 
skin at various locations such as various areas of the head, palm of the 
hand, leg, and back. Corcoran found that figures drawn on the body in 
front of an imaginary line through the center of the head (vertical 
plane), approximately in line with the ear canal, were perceived as the 
mirror image of the experimenter's view. In contrast, figures drawn 
behind the line were perceived from the same orientation as the experi-
menter's. It was hypothesized that a translation of the location of the 
mind's eye resulted in the different perceptions of the figures. If 
figures were drawn behind the imaginary line, the mind's eye was thought 
to move to a location behind the subject's head. If figures were drawn 
in front of the imaginary line, the mind's eye was thought to remain at 
a default position somewhere inside the subject's head. 
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A similar study designed to investigate the strategy of translating 
the mind's eye was reported by Duke (1966). This study used essentially 
the same procedure as Corcoran. In Duke's experiment a 'frontal-plane' 
hypothesis was posited to explain the orientation of the perceiver to 
finger drawings upon the body surface. This hypothesis stated that sym-
bols which are drawn upon the anterior and posterior surfaces of the 
body are perceived as if they were projected out in front of the subject 
on a transparent two-dimensional surface. Implicit in this hypothesis 
is that geometrically the body is a transparent surface and that the 
locus of perception is from a fixed point behind the subject. The fixed 
point notion is contrary to Corcoran's moving internal-external origin. 
According to the frontal-plane hypothesis all body drawings on the 
anterior surface are viewed as if looking through the body. All body 
drawings on the posterior surface are viewed as if looking at the back 
of the body so that a view similar to the experimenter's is taken. 
Duke's results were interpreted in support for his hypothesis. Unfor-
tunately, his results do not discount the possibility that the mind's 
eye may translate from one location to another. 
An experiment designed in part to distinguish whether the locus 
from which image perception originates remains fixed behind the head 
(frontal-plane hypothesis) or whether it shifts between the inside and 
outside of the head was performed by Weber and Mankin (Note l) . With a 
method similar to Duke's, Weber and Mankin used the top of the head and 
under the chin, along with other skin areas, as sites to trace figures. 
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If the locus of the mind's eye is fixed behind the head then drawings on 
the top and bottom of the head were expected to result in neither pre-
dominately internal nor external orientations. On the other hand, if 
regular results were obtained on the top and bottom of the head, then 
the frontal-plane hypothesis could not be true in general.· Weber and 
Mankin reported that subjects did respond consistently to figures drawn 
on the top and bottom of their heads. These results supported the con-
tention that the mind's eye can translate from internal to external 
origins along at least two tracks: up/down and fore/aft. 
A curious phenomenon reported by Weber and Mankin was that some 
subjects identified figures from orientations which could only be ex-
plained if the mind's eye was translated to an upside down position. 
This phenomenon suggested two possible orientations of the mind's eye 
beyond the internal and external locations previously discussed. These 
two additional orientations occur when the mind's eye is upside down and 
is either internally or externally located. Therefore, four possible 
orientations for the mind's eye in response to cutaneous drawings on the 
head have been identified: (1) an upright position from inside the head 
looking out - up/inside, (2) an upright position from outside the head 
looking in - up/outside, (3) an upside down position from inside the 
head looking out - down/inside, and (4) an upside down position from out-
side the head looking in - down/outside. 
In a pilot study, Mankin and Fiebig tested subjects on the speed at 
which they could assume the four orientations listed above. Letters (£, 
~,£,~) were traced on each of four sides of a subject's head (forehead, 
back, left side, or right side). Subjects were asked to assume one of 
the four orientations (up/inside, up/outside, down/inside, down/outside) 
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immediately after a test letter had been drawn. The fastest reaction 
times occurred when the instructed orientation coincided with what could 
be considered a natural, or 'default', orientation for each of the four 
sides of the head. Appendix A gives a table of means for this pilot 
data. The results were used to support the contention that it takes a 
longer time for the mind's eye to transform.its location and orientation 
to a position other than the default position and that the greater the 
cognitive effort for the transformation, the longer the time. 
Mankin performed a second pilot experiment designed to measure the 
speed and accuracy with which a person could name figures drawn on the 
skin. Subjects were first asked to assume one of the four mental per-
spectives of the mind's eye discussed above before receiving a cutaneous 
drawing. Subjects were then told to take one of the four mind's eye 
perspectives on either their forehead, back of the head, left side, or 
right side. When the subject reported that a clear image of his or her 
head had been achieved in the instructed perspective, the experimenter 
drew a letter on that same head area. Subjects were then asked to name 
the letter as quickly and as accurately as possible while maintaining 
the instructed perspective. 
Midway through the experiment, it was discovered that some subjects 
were not attempting to create an image of their head prior to receiving 
the stimulus. Rather than rotating the mind's eye, these subjects 
simply rotated the image of the letter after it was drawn. The mind's 
eye, in this case, remained stationary instead of following the instruc-
tions to move while holding the letter stationary. These transformations 
of the letter resulted in a response which was functionally equivalent 
to the expected response if the subject had transformed the mind's eye. 
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That is, subjects used one of four possible operations to transform and 
perceive the image: (1) perceive the letter exactly as it appeared from 
the default perspective - normal, (2) rotate the letter in the depth 
plane so that an image equivalent to the mirror image of the letter was 
seen - mirror image, (3) rotate the letter in the picture plane so that 
it was upside down in the six o'clock position - upside down, (4) flip 
the letter in the depth plane so that it was upside down and backwards 
mirror + upside down. 
The unexpected transformation strategy found in the second Mankin 
pilot study was reportedly easier for subjects than the strategy given 
in the instructions. Discovering that some subjects were using this 
alternative strategy raised the question of whether or not simply trans-
forming the image of the figure is in fact more efficient and effective 
compared to transforming the location and orientation of the mind's eye. 
An important question is raised because of the two functionally 
equivalent strategies described in the above introduction. This ques-
tion pert.ains to the distinction between the mental imagery literature 
and the cognitive mapping literature. Kosslyn (1980), for example, pre-
sented an impressive account of mental imagery theory and experimenta-
tion. Others, as early as Tolman (1948) have studied the concept of a 
cognitive map. Appendix B of this paper will compare theories such as 
those given by Kosslyn with the literature on cognitive mapping. But 
for now, the impression involved with a cognitive map is that people 
change the body coordinates rather than the map coordinates when examin-
ing different views of the map. 
The purpose of this experiment is to compare two functionally 
equivalent strategies for transforming visual images. Two image trans-
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formation groups will use transformations of the visual image as irt the 
Cooper and Shepard experiments. Two mind's eye transfo_rmation groups 
will use transformation of the location of the mind's eye as in the 
Weber and Mankin experiments. On the basis of an informal data analysis 
and post-experiment interviews in the Mankin pilot study, it is hypothe-
sized that the image transformation strategy will result in greater 
speed and accuracy. Further, based on Weber and Mankin's results, the 
specific operations for both strategies which are closest to the 'de-
fault' mental perspective will result in better performance. For sim-
plicity, only two head surfaces were used: the forehead, representing a 
skin area with a strong default orientation, and the left side of the 
head, representing a skin area with an inconsistent default orientation. 
Other head areas could have been chosen but it was hypothesized that the 
results from these two would generalize to other areas. The purpose of 
including an area with an inconsistent default orientation was to test 
if the mind's eye transformations would be equivalent for up/inside and 
up/outside of the head. 
Method 
Subjects 
Twenty-four male and 24 female undergraduate psychology students at 
Oklahoma State University were randomly assigned to four experimental 
groups with an equal number of males and females in each group. All 
subjects ranged in age from 18-24 years old and were native speakers of 
the English language. The subjects were given extra credit in their 
courses in return for participation. An additional five subjects were 
discarded because their patterns of errors indicated an inability to 
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correctly perform the task. 
Procedure 
The two image transformation groups (forehead group and left side 
of the head group) were asked to make rotations of the visual image 
while keeping the location of the mind's eye stationary. The two mind's 
eye transformation groups (forehead group and left side group) were 
asked to make translations of the mind's eye while keeping the image of 
the letter on the head stationary. Functionally equivalent operations 
were executed in each of the two transformation strategy conditions. 
Each of the four operations for each group were numerically coded to in-
sure that all groups received the exact same cueing stimuli. For the 
image transformation groups, the four numerical cueing codes (!'~'l'!) 
were defined as: 1. normal (mind's eye stationary and located inside 
the head looking out), 2. mirror image (image rotated in the depth plane 
so that the mirror image of the original figure as seen from inside the 
head looking out is seen), 3. upside down (image rotated in the picture 
plane so that it is upside down in the six o'clock position), 4. mirror 
+ upside down (image flipped in the depth plane so that it appears up-
side down and backwards). For the mind's eye transformation groups, the 
four numerical cueing codes (l,~'l'!) were defined as: 1. up/inside 
(mind's .eye inside the head looking out, where the mind's eye is in an 
upright orientation), 2. up/outside (mind's eye outside the head looking 
back towards the head, where the mind's eye is in an upright orienta-
tion), 3. down/inside (mind's eye inside looking out, where it is in an 
upside down orientation), 4. down/outside (mind's eye outside looking in, 
where it is in an upside down orientation) . 
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Presentations on the left side of the head were immediately anterior 
to the ear. Four stimulus items (£1 ~,£,~) were traced for each of the 
four operations. Two complete replications of the 16 unique combinations 
of letter and operation were given to each subject. Each replication 
contained uniquely randomized presentations of the 16 combinations and 
immediately followed each other. In summary, the design consisted of 2 
transformation strategies (image, mind's eye) x 2 head surfaces (fore-
head, left side) x 2 sexes x 4 operations (normal or up/inside, mirror 
image or up/outside, upside down or down/outside, and mirror down 
upside down or down/outside) x 4 letters (£1 ~,£,~) x 2 replications. The 
transformations, head surfaces, and sex variables were between-subjects; 
the other variables were within-subjects. 
Subjects were first instructed about the details of the experiment, 
including the identities and meanings of the cueing codes, the strategy 
for transforming the image or the mind's eye, and other aspects of the 
procedure. A one-foot square glass plate with a printed lower case 
letter (£) was used to explain how different image rotations or transla-
tions of the mind's eye could result in the perception of other letters 
(~,£,~). Subjects in the mind's eye condition were instructed as to how 
they should translate the mind's eye by witnessing the drawing of a 
human unisex figure placed in different orientations to the glass plate. 
The subjects were cautioned to respond as quickly but as accurately as 
possible, with the emphasis upon maintaining clear accurate visual 
images of the stimuli. The instructions for the image transformation 
strategy groups were similar to those for the mind's eye transformation 
strategy groups except for the obvious differences in explaining the 
appropriate transformation strategy. Appendix C gives the verbatim 
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instructions for both strategies. 
Two series of practice trials were given to each s~bject during the 
instructional period. The first series helped subjects to memorize the 
numerical cueing codes. The second series was to insure that people 
were thoroughly familiar with the task, with subjects experiencing each 
of the four operations. Presentation order for each set of practice 
trials was composed of a unique random combination of operation and let-
ter. If any subject was unable to comprehend or perform the task as 
indicated during practice, he or she was not considered in the experi-
ment. 
After receiving instructions and training, subjects closed their 
eyes for the entire replication. The male experimenter simultaneously 
traced a letter on the appropriate head area and verbally gave one of 
the numerical cues for the required operation. The clock was started at 
the same time that the numerical cue was given. The time for simul-
taneously tracing the figure and verbally presenting the numerical 
cueing code was approximately 1.5 seconds. Subjects pressed a button 
control connected to a millisecond timer which stopped the timer and 
displayed the reaction time for naming the letter. The subjects were 
asked to verbally name the letter at exactly the same time as they 
stopped the clock. The experimenter then recorded the subject's reac-
tion time and verbal response in order to score speed and accuracy. 
Figure 1 graphically displays the time course for a single trial. 
Insert Figure 1 about here 
At the end of the two 16 trial replications, all subjects were 
asked a short series of questions. The post-experiment questions were: 
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(l) What percent of the time did you accidentally open your eyes during 
the experiment? (2) Which of the ways of changing the image (your per-
spective) seemed most difficult? (3) What did you see in your mind as 
you were trying to decide which letter it was? (4) What do you think 
the purpose of this experiment was? These questions were used primarily 
to verify if subjects correctly followed the instructions and used the 
transformation strategy appropriate to their group. 
Stimuli 
Stimuli were the four lower-case letters ~,~,£,i· They were firmly 
traced with the experimenter's finger on a 3 x 6 em. area each on the 
subject's skin. All letters were traced starting with the stem of the 
letter and proceeding to the circle. The writing time was about 1.5 
seconds. 
Results 
The most important result is indicated by the significant interac-
tion between the two transformation strategies and the four operations, 
~ (3,120) = 11.77, £ < .001. Figure 2 displays the means, standard 
deviations and percentage of errors for this interaction. 
Insert Figure 2 about here 
The image strategy subjects responded in a gradually slower fashion 
across the four operations (normal mean = 1.082 seconds, mirror image 
2.004, upside down= 2.739, and mirror+ upside down= 2.969). For 
Newman-Keuls' multiple range tests, critical differences for significance 
are reported. The Newman-Keuls' test revealed that none of these four 
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operations is significantly different from its adjacent operation. 
Overall, though, the gradually increasing function of mean reaction 
times across these four operations is significant with differences ex-
ceeding the value, C.diff.4 = 1.255, £ < .05. The mind's eye strategy 
subjects, on the other hand, responded in a dramatically slower fashion 
across the four equivalent operations (up/inside mean = 1.851 seconds, 
up/outside= 3.908, down/inside= 6.271, and down/outside= 7.507). The 
Newman-Keuls' test between this set of means revealed that each of the 
four operations is significantly slower than the preceding operation 
(C.diff.2 = .955, £ < .05). The default operations for each transforma-
tion strategy (normal for the image strategy and up/inside or up/outside 
for the mind's eye strategy) did not differ from each other with respect 
to reaction time (C.diff.2 = 1.219). 
The percentages of errors for the transformation by operation inter-
action are given in the bottom right corner of Figure 2. For each data 
point there was a total of 192 errors possible. As shown, the range of 
errors is from 0% in the normal operation in the image transfromation 
strategy to 39% in the down/outside operation in the mind's eye strategy. 
Error rates were positively correlated with reaction times over both 
transformations with~= .95, £ < .001. The patterns of errors showed 
that the majority of mistakes occurred when subjects responded by naming 
the mirror image of the correct letter. This was especially true for the 
mind's eye transformation group where 84% of all errors were of this 
type. Among the image transformation subjects, this pattern of respond-
ing dropped to 58%. 
An analysis of variance was conducted on correct reaction time 
scores with 2 transformation strategies (image and mind's eye) x 2 head 
areas (forehead and left side) x 2 sexes as the between subjects vari-
ables. The within-subjects variables were 4 operations (normal or up/ 
inside, mirror image or up/outside, upside down or down/inside, and 
mirror + upside down or down/outside) x 2 replications. The analyses 
were performed on correct responses only. Four stimuli were presented 
in each of the eight within-subjects conditions. Because of errors on 
one or more of these four stimuli, the mean response time across the 
eight cells for each subject were used in the analyses. 
A summary of the analysis of variance is given in Appendix D. As 
expected, the image transformation groups responded significantly 
faster than the mind's eye transformation groups, ! (1,40) = 38.61, 
£ < .001. The mean for the image transformation = 2.185 seconds and 
the mean for the mind's eye transformation= 4.884 seconds. 
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A significant effect occurred between the four pairs of function-
ally equivalent operations, ! (3,120) = 49.01, £ < .001. Even though 
the two transformation strategies used structurally dissimilar processes 
in performing the operations, the analysis of variance indicated that 
across both transformations the operations were increasingly time con-
suming, in the order normal or up/inside, mirror image or up/outside, 
upside down or down/inside, and mirror + upside down or down/outside. 
The respective means were 1.439, 2.956, 4.505 and 5.238 seconds. A 
Newman-Keuls' test showed that these pairwise means were significantly 
different from one another (C.diff.2 = .675, £ < .05). 
Replication 1 of the experiment revealed a manner of responding 
which was significantly slower than replication 2 (mean for replication 
1 = 3.715, mean for replication 2 = 3.354},! (1,40) = 6.61, £ < .05. 
There was a significant sex x replication interaction with, F (1,40) = 
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6.38, p < .05. Males in replication 1 had a mean time of 3.667 seconds. 
In replication 2 their times dropped to 2.953 seconds. The Newrnan-
Keuls' test indicated that this drop in times was significant (C.diff.2 
= .40, £ < .05). Females on the other hand did not differ in their 
reaction times across the two replications (replication 1 mean= 3.763, 
replication 2 mean= 3.756). Finally, a significant effect was observed 
on the interaction between transformation strategy, sex, and replication 
with, ! (1,40) = 4.61, ~ < .05. This interaction indicated that males 
in the mind's eye transformation groups responded significantly faster 
across replications with replication 1 mean = 5.133 seconds and replica-
tion 2 mean= 4.145 seconds (C.diff.3 = .681, £ < .05). Males in the 
image transformation groups responded about equally as fast across 
replications. Female response patterns remained essentially unchanged 
across the two transformations and replications. In sum, the signifi-
cant replication effect can be attributed primarily to the increased 
speed of male subjects in the mind's eye transformation groups. 
Finally, the analysis of variance indicated that two additional in-
teractions were significant. First, an effect was calculated on the head 
surface x replication x operation interaction with, ! (3,120) 4.17, 
£ < .01. A preliminary analysis of the means resulted in the conclusion 
that the effect was due to chance fluctuations in the data. These fluc-
tuations occurred predominately on two of the four operations in each 
replication (upside down and down/inside; and mirror + upside down and 
down/outside) . Second, the transformation x head surface x replication 
x operation interaction was significant with, F (3,120) = 3.08, £ < .05. 
Again, no interpretable results could be determined in an exploratory 
analysis of the means. The mind's eye transformation on the forehead 
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and ieft side of the head showed unsystematic fluctuations of reaction 
times on the down/inside and down/outside opeations. 
The post-experiment questionnaire showed that 100% of the subjects 
reported that they kept their eyes closed throughout the experiment. A 
small percentage of subjects did claim that this was difficult to do. 
In terms of the relative difficulty of performing the four operations, 
44% of the image transformation subjects reported that the mirror + up-
side down operation was the hardest. The second most difficult opera-
tion was upside down (33%). The mirror image operation was thought to 
be relatively easy (13%), while the normal, or default, perspective was 
easiest (4%). For the mind's eye transformation, the most difficult 
operation was down/outside (60%) . The remaining 40% of the subjects 
stated that the down/inside operation was hardest. 
An important post-experiment question dealt with what the subjects 
'saw' in their imagination while trying to decide which letter was cor-
rect. The vast majority of the image strategy subjects reported that 
they saw the letters rotating, flipping, or moving. Some of these sub-
jects stated that the letter appeared to be on a glass plate or black-
board. The mind's eye strategy subjects generally claimed that they 
would mentally spin, rotate, or move around to achieve the correct per-
spective, then look at the letter from that perspective. Approximately 
10% of the mind's eye subjects claimed that when they mentally stood on 
their heads, they would frequently lose sight of the letter. Others 
claimed that when they mentally moved around, the letters would unin-
tentionally move or turn. 
Although all subjects claimed that they adhered to the instructed 
method for transforming images and the mind's eye, the post-experiment 
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interview indicated that for the mind's eye subjects this may not have 
been entirely true. Fifty percent of the males in the mind's eye 
groups related that they at times used alternative strategies when try-
ing to transform the mind's eye. Typically these alternative strate-
gies were of two types: when moving the mind's eye to the down/outside 
position, some males simply moved as if they were "peeking over a wall 
at the letter". Another strategy for the down/outside position was to 
move the mind's eye to the up/outside position, then rotate the letter 
so that a functionally equivalent answer to down/outside was obtained. 
Only 25% of the mind's eye transformation females reported using alter-
native strategies at times but no typical instructional deviations 
could be determined. In all, the percent of deviation from instruc-
tions for any one subject did not necessitate that they be replaced. 
These deviations probably led to making the transformation differences 
obtained more conservative, because they focused on making the difficult 
operations easier. 
As to the purpose of the experiment, most subjects thought it was 
designed to study the speed of perception or to study how we see and 
visualize things. 
Discussion 
The findings of the present study verified that image transforma-
tion with the mind's eye fixed in a stationary position is more effi-
cient and effective than transformations where the image is fixed and 
the mind's eye moves. These results support the pilot data which sug-
gested that people at times prefer to transform the image rather than 
the location of the mind's eye. This is not surprising when one con-
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siders the complexity of mind's eye transformations. Apparently trans-
lating the mind's eye requires at least two parallel processes: attend-
ing to the coordinate system through which the mind's eye is moving, 
and continuing to refresh the target image. Jonides (1980) documented 
a high cost of shifting attentional resources on images. Therefore, 
the mind's eye strategy in the present experiment seems to require 
parallel allocation of resources between attention shifts and the fixed 
image of the stimulus. 
These results may shed some light on cognitive processes responsi-
ble for the results of the Kolers and Perkins (1969a, 1969b) letter 
identification task. Kolers and Perkins found increasing reaction 
times and error rates for normal, upside down, mirror image, and mirror 
+ upside down transformations of letters, respectively. Their results 
for the upside down and mirror image transformations were similar to 
the same transformations in the present image strategy condition. That 
is, there were no appreciable differences between these two transforma-
tions. In the present experiment, the mind's eye transformation re-
sulted in significant differences between operations which are func-
tionally equivalent to the upside down and mirror image operations. 
This suggests that subjects in the Kolers and Perkins study were using 
an image transformation strategy for the upside down and mirror image 
operatio"ns. The 'inverted' or mirror + upside down operation in the 
Kolers and Perkins study showed response patterns which suggest that 
subjects were using a mind's eye, or combination image and mind's eye, 
transformation strategy. That is, responses for the inverted operation 
were significantly longer and less accurate than both the upside down 
and the mirror image operations. 
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The interaction between transformation strategy and type of opera-
tion suggests that the mind's eye transformation is more sensitive to 
increased cognitive loads than is image transformation. As the mind's 
eye operations departed from the default positions the speed and 
accuracy with which visual images could be manipulated deteriorated 
quite rapidly. Image transformation, on the other hand, remained rela-
tively stable through various operations. It appears then that the 
structural processes associated with image transformations as opposed 
to mind's eye transformations are not disrupted as much by increased 
cognitive load. It is unclear though whether the cognitive load 
created by the four operations in the image transformation strategy can 
be equated with the load created by the four operations in the mind's 
eye transformation strategy. Finally, as expected, the fastest opera-
tions for both the image transformation and the mind's eye transforma-
tion were the normal and up/inside operations respectively. These 
operations actually required no movement in the imagery system at all. 
It is thought that the mind's eye transformation strategy may be nearly 
as effective a method as image transformation as long as the required 
movements of the mind's eye are along simple, well traversed dimensions. 
For example, the up/outside origin is a very consistent default posi-
tion for stimuli traced on the top and back of the head (see Weber and 
Mankin, Note 1). Mind's eye movements along the track from up/inside 
the head to up/outside on the top and back should be quite fast and 
accurate. 
It is unclear why subjects responded equally well between the two 
head areas. Weber and Mankin determined that the sides of the head had 
no consistent default perspective for the mind's eye. That is, people 
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responded with a mixture of up/inside and up/outside orientations to 
cutaneous tracings. The forehead, on the other hand, possessed a clear 
default origin. It was expected that for the mind's eye transformation 
the forehead would show faster reaction times for the up/inside origin 
than for up/outside, while these two orientations should have had about 
equal times on the left side of the head. Results showed that the ex-
pectations based on default origins of the mind's eye were not con-
firmed. The most simple interpretation of this finding is that the 
reaction times measured in this experiment are more sensitive than the 
frequency measures on which the default results were based. That is, 
the frequency measures (Weber and 11ankin, note l) indicated a nearly 
equal distribution of subjects who gave up/inside and up/outside res-
ponses to letters drawn on the sides of the head. These frequency 
measures provided no information on the speed with which responses were 
made. 
Consider now the results from the two replications. Overall, 
replication 2 showed faster reaction times. This is not surprising 
when one considers the effects of practice in memorizing cueing codes. 
What is of interest is the interactions between replication and sex. 
Males seemed to experience a greater practice effect when moving the 
mind's eye through difficult operations than did females. Duke (1966) 
argued that males showed less strict adherence of the mind's eye to de-
fault orientations. Allen and Rudy (1970) tested Duke's findings but 
found no sex differences. The present findings were not interpreted in 
support for Duke's sex and default adherence idea. Instead, because 
males performed better on the more complex mind's eye operations, a 
different set of hypotheses is offered. Hinztman (1979) reported that 
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subjects did benefit from repetition of orientation but found no dif-
ferences between sexes on simple tasks. The findings in the present 
study therefore may be explained in at least two ways. First, it is 
possible that males are more effective than females in performing com-
plex frame of reference shifts in visual imagery. A second explana-
tion is that some males may have developed alternative strategies which 
facilitated the mind's eye movement whereas females adhered to the 
instructed transformation. The results of the post-experiment ques-
tionnaire do tend to support this second explanation. 
Finally, the proportion of errors made in naming letters from dif-
ferent operations increased with reaction times. This result, although 
contrary to the usual speed/accuracy tradeoff, is probable for at least 
two reasons. First, it appears that visual images require considerable 
maintenance (Kosslyn, 1980). The more complex operations in the study 
may require enough cognitive effort so that routine refreshing of 
images is impaired. Second, concerning the high error rate for the 
mind's eye transformation, it is possible that incidental flipping or 
rotating of the letters occurred along with the translation of the 
mind's eye. The second account for the patterns of errors has some 
merit. The percentage of errors which were the mirror image of the 
correct response was extremely high. This inadvertant mirror imaging 
could easily occur if subjects experienced difficulty holding images in 
a fixed position. Furthermore, post-experiment interviews confirmed 
that some subjects had difficulty holding images in a fixed position 
while they performed translations of the mind's eye. The hypothesis 
that the patterns of errors were the result of incidental flipping of 
images lends support to Hintzman's (Note 2) studies on cognitive maps. 
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Hintzman contends that difficult rotations of cognitive maps may result 
in incidental mirror imaging of some parts of the map. 
The results of the present study raise an important question. It 
is apparent that people can either transform an image or transform the 
orientation of the mind's eye to achieve functionally equivalent per-
spectives of an imaged object. Are there features of particular images 
or of tasks involving images which govern whether or not one of these 
two strategies is generally employed? 
Reference Notes 
1. Weber, R. J. and Mankin, R. W. The orientation of the mind's eye 
to cutaneous drawings. Unpublished manuscript. 1981. 
2. Hintzman, D. L. Orientation in cognitive maps. Final report sub-
mitted to the National Science Foundation. NSF award number: 
BNS 76-01830, 1979. 
3. Wiseman, G. & Neisser, U. Perceptual organization as a determinant 
of visual recognition memory. Paper presented at a meeting of the 
Eastern Psychological Association, Spring, 1971. 
4. Hintzman, D. L. Review of Kosslyn's "Image and Mind". Manuscript 
submitted for publication, 1981. 
26 
References 
Allen, D. B. & Rudy, K. P. Perception of simple figures drawn upon the 
body surface. Perceptual and Motor Skills, 1970, 30, 369-370. 
Anderson, J. R. Arguments concerning representations for mental 
imagery. Psychological Review, 1978, 85, 249-277. 
Anderson, J. R. & Bower, G. H. Human associative memory. New York: 
John Wiley and Sons, 1973. 
Attneave, F. & Farrar, P. The visual world behind the head. American 
Journal of Psychology. 1977, 90, 549-563. 
Cooper, L. A. & Shepard, R. N. Chronometric studies of the rotation of 
mental images. In Visual information processing, Ed. W. G. Chase. 
New York: Academic Press, 1973. 
Cooper, L. A. & Shepard, R. N. Mental transformation in .the identifi-
cation of left and right hands. Journal of Experimental Psychology: 
Human Perception and Performance, 1975, 1, 48-56. 
Corcoran, D. W. J. The phenomena of the desembodied eye or is it a 
matter of personal geography? Perception, 1977, .§._, 247-253. 
Downs, R. M. & Stea, D. Image and environment: cognitive mapping and 
spatial behavior. Chicago: Aldine Publishing Co., 1973. 
Duke, J. D. Perception of finger drawings upon the body surface. The 
Journal of General Psychology, 1966, ~, 305-314. 
Jonides, J. Towards a model of the mind's eye movement. Canadian 
Journal of Psychology, 1980, 34, 103-112. 
27 
--------
28 
Jonides, J. Voluntary versus automatic control over the mind's eye 
movement. In Attention and performance IX, Eds. J. Long & A. Bradde-
ley. Hillsdate, New Jersey: Lawrence Erlbaurn Assoc., 1981. 
Kolers, P. A. & Perkins, D. N. Orientation of letters and errors in 
their recognition. Perception and Psychophysics, 1969a, 5 265-
269. 
Kolers, P. A. & Perkins, D. N. Orientation of letters and their speed 
of recognition. Perception and Psychophysics, 1969b, ~, 275-280. 
Kosslyn, S. M. Scanning visual images: Some structural implications. 
Perception and Psychophysics, 1973, 14, 90-94. 
Kosslyn, S. M. Information representation in visual images. Cognitive 
Psychology, 1975, 2, 341-370. 
Kosslyn, S. M. Image and mind. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 
1980. 
Kosslyn, s. M. The medium and the message in mental imagery: A theory. 
Psychological Review, 1981, 88, 46-66. 
Kosslyn, S. M. & Shwartz, S. P. A. A simulation of visual imagery. 
Cognitive Science, 1977, ~, 265-295. 
Krech, D. & Crutchfield, R. S. Elements of psychology. New York: 
Knopf, 1958. 
Paivio, A. Imagery and Language. In Imagery: Current cognitive ap-
proachs. Ed. S. J. Segal. New York: Academic Press, 1971. 
Pylyshyn, z. W. What the mind's eye tells the mind's brain: A critique 
of mental imagery. Psychological Bulletin, 1973, 80, 1-23. 
Pylyshyn, Z. W. The imagery debate: Analogue media versus tacit knowl-
edge. Psychological Review, 1981, 88, 16-45. 
Shepard, R. N. The mental image. American Psychologist, 1978, 12, 
125-137. 
29 
Tolman, F. C. Cognitive maps in rats and men. Psychological Review, 
1948, 55, 189-208. 
Trowbridge, C. c. On fundamental methods of orientation and "imaginary 
maps". Science, 1913, 2§_, 888-897. 
Weber, R. J. Image and mind by Stephen Michael Kosslyn. Contemporary 
Psychology, 1981, ~, 581-583. 
Figure Captions 
Figure 1. Time course of a single trial. 
Figure 2. Mean reaction times and error percentages for transformation 
strategies across operations, with standard deviations adjacent to 
each mean. 
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Table 1 
Mean Reaction Times (msec.) (Mankin and Fiebig Pilot Study) 
n = 6 
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up/inside up/outside down/inside down/outside 
397.13 499.94 953.87 1507.7 
573.22 270.91 1056.29 890.05 
389.18 372.95 764.73 937.63 
549.57 809.43 1032.21 1303.42 
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Introduction 
The present experiment compares two fundamentally different methods 
for making rotations or transformations in spatial imagery. In the 
first method, transforming the image, the person performs an alteration 
of the image while the mind's eye remains at a fixed orientation. This 
behavior is analogous to that of observing a cathode ray tube where the 
transformations occur in a coordinate space out 'in front' of the mind's 
eye. Kosslyn (1980, 1981) has elaborated in great detail upon this 
method of image transformation. In his publications, Kosslyn summar-
ized an enormous amount of research which analyzes such things as the 
generation of visual images, how we inspect visual images, and trans-
formation of images. In addition, Kosslyn posits a comprehensive 
theory to account for the findings of this research. Part of this 
theory is the notion that people utilize a mental screen of definable 
parameters upon which images are formatted. 
A second method for making changes in a person's visual image sys-
tem occurs when the mind's eye does not remain fixed but seems to move 
in a three-dimensional coordinate space around a. fixed image. This 
behavior may occur, for example, when a person assumes a 'bird's eye 
view' of some imagined object or scene. The notion that one can move 
through different mental points of view is implied in' literature that 
focuses upon cognitive maps (Tolman, 1948) and literature dealing with 
attention allocation (Jonides, 1980). Implicit in this view is that 
people are free to allocate attention in spatial images while the image 
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itself remains fixed. 
The concept of a 'mind's eye' is best defined as a simile for the 
interpretive processes that extract information from the image puffer. 
These interpretive processes behave as i~ they are a disembodied eye 
that can (a) move around the mental representation of the environment 
or (b) produce or interpret operations on the image representation. 
This appendix will outline differences between the two transforma-
tion processes introduced above by discussing and summarizing key re-
search and then placing the findings of that research in a general 
theoretical context. Before starting, comments on an overall theory of 
mental images will provide some perspective. 
Mental Images as Propositions or Quasi-Pictures 
A long-standing debate regarding the nature of mental images re-
mains to some degree unresolved (Pylyshyn, 1981). This debate centers 
around whether spatial representations of information (images) are 
analogic or propositional in structure. The following discussion 
should help dispel some of the arguments against the view that images 
are .not quasi-pictorial analog spatial depictions but rather are epi-
phenomenal by-products of propositional processing. This second 
alternative rests upon the argument that images appear to behave as 
second-order isomorphic spatial presentations simply because people 
have tacit knowledge of the behavior of real world objects (Pylyshyn, 
1981). 
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The Propositional View 
Anderson (1978) outlined the defining terms of the concept of a 
proposition. He stated that a proposition is abstract, it has a truth 
value, and it has rules of formation. Abr;tractness refers to the 'in-
variance' of a proposition. That is, propositions may b~ paraphrased 
across languages. The truth value of a proposition refers to the 
logical relatedness of it to other propositions. Finally, the rules of 
formation of a proposition mean that a well-formed proposition adheres 
to clearly identifiable predicates and arguments. In sum, a proposi-
tion is not synonomous with verbal or pictorial representations of 
information. Rather, it is an encoding system which is unavailable to 
phenomenological interpretation but which underlies such interpreta-
tions. 
A group of researchers, particularly Pylyshyn (1973) and Anderson 
and Bower (1973) hold that images are coded in an abstract proposi-
tional format in much the same manner as semantic information. Accord-
ing ·to this view, images cari be diagrammed in an hierachical fashion 
which depicts the relationships among parts of the image. Dynamic 
functions such as scanning and rotating images is thought to occur in a 
sequential, propositional form (cf. Hintzman, Note 2). 
Anderson and Bower (1973) argued that image scanning in a sequen-
tial manner occurs much like the functioning of a computer program. 
They state that a proper explanation of image scanning must account for 
(a) the symbol structure that represents spatial information, and {b) 
the executive processes that operate upon that information. The com-
puter program metaphor, which Anderson and Bower adopted to account for 
linguistic systems, was used to argue for the similarity between visual 
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images and language. In other words, images as quasi-pictorial analogs 
of perceptions have no intrinsic structural properties which make them 
stand apart from abstract propositional encodings. 
Anderson and Bower used results from an experiment by Wiseman and 
Neisser (Note 3) to support this claim. Wiseman and Neisser showed sub-
jects Mooney pictures (relatively ambiguous spots of ink which were 
obtained by deleting parts of natural objects) . Subjects were asked to 
construct the concealed objects from the parts on the cards. In addi-
tion to this set of cards, subjects were also shown some previously 
shown and some distractor pictures. For each of the test cards the sub-
ject was asked (a) to 'see' some object in the pattern and say what he 
saw, and (b) to judge whether or not he had seen this exact stimulus 
pattern before. Results indicated that subjects could not remember 
seeing patterns which they had previously seen before unless they were 
able to interpret those patterns and give them a name. Anderson and 
Bower used these results to support their claim that people do not re-
member visual scenes but rather remember interpretations. In other 
words, images are not stored in memory; only information represented as 
abstracted, conceptual propositions is stored. 
The crucial point of the propositional view of imagery is that 
people are mistaken when they interpret visual images as something 
unique in cognition. Rather, the argument states that visual or mental 
images are not unique either functionally or structurally from a prin-
ciple representation which is neutral with respect to modality. 
The Quasi-Pictorial View 
Kosslyn (1973), Shepard (1978), and Paivio (1971) differ from 
those who hold to a strict propositional view of imagery by offering 
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evidence that images are qualitatively distinct cognitive events. This 
is not to say that propositional encodings have nothing whatsoever to 
do with visual images, but only that there is a distinction between 
surface representations and the deep structure by which those represen-
tations are derived. 
Kosslyn (1973) addressed the question of whether or not images are 
subject to the same processing requirements as verbal information. 
Kosslyn's hypothesis was that if images (surface representations) are 
qualitatively different from semantic material then subjects who scan 
visual images of objects will do so at a faster rate than subjects who 
memorize information about the same objects. Kosslyn thought that sub-
jects who image objects have access to most if not all of the informa-
tion about the imaged object simultaneously. Subjects who have memo-
rized verbal reports must retrieve information from a sequential search 
through a propositional network. The image group subjects first 
familiarized themselves with a series of pictures (boat, airplane, 
lighthouse, etc.). After they had memorized the objects and claimed 
they could see mental pictures of them, they were asked if certain 
properties existed on the imaged objects. Half the time the test item 
was present, and half the time it was not. Subjects were asked to 
"look at the image", while focusing on a starting point either at the 
left-or _right end of the image, and press one button if they could see 
the test item and push another button if they could not. Members of 
the verbal report group (who apparently did not use mental images) were 
asked to memorize verbal discriptions of the objects. These subjects 
were first asked to name objects on either the beginning or the end of 
the description list before receiving a probe word. When the probe 
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word appeared, subjects who had named an object on the tail end of the 
list were thought to move backwards through the list in order to verify 
the probe. Subjects who had named an object on the front end of the 
list were thought to move forewards through the list in order to verify 
the probe. Results of the experiment showed that, for the image group, 
more time was taken to "scan" across longer distances. For the verbal 
group, the effects of distance were much more pronounced. Also, it was 
equally easy for image group subjects to scan from_right to left as it 
was to scan left to right. The verbal group subjects, on the other 
hand, found it much more time-consuming to scan right to left than left 
to right. The results from this study, supported by results from a 
later series of similar experiments on image scanning (see Kosslyn, 
1980, chapter 3), suggest that image scanning involves processes which 
are different from those used while working with verbal descriptions. 
Verbal descriptions appear to be controlled by propositional formatting 
structures like links, nodes, and the like (Anderson and Bower, 1973), 
whereas images may be controlled by the formatting structures of a 
visual buffer system. 
It is apparent that a visual or mental image, once it has been 
constructed, has at least some unique properties and functions. Those 
who argue for a propositional structure of imagery focus primarily upon 
the construction process or the deep representational structure. 
Researchers like Kosslyn, who argue that the surface representation is 
dissimilar from the deep structure, openly admit that some processing 
of deeper, possibly non-spatial information is involved in the imagery 
system. The dif~erence is that quasi-pictorialists are convinced of the 
unique functional and structural properties of the surface 
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representation. 
Mental Images 
Much can be said about the nature of mental images. The purpose 
here is not to summarize research on all aspects of images, but only to 
focus upon the image after it has undergone construction. This discus-
sion will be limited to the subjectively experienced image which is 
assumed to be a distinct class of cognitive phenomena. The purpose 
here is to establish an argument that mental images are structurally 
different, albeit related, to mental maps. 
Pylyshyn (1981) attacked the theory that images are analog spatial 
phenomena by comparing the behavior of images to laws of physics. He 
stated that if images were pictures in the mind (first-order isomor-
phisms), they would have actual distances. The argument proceeds that 
if actual distances existed, then image rotation would follow the law: 
T D/S . (l) 
In this equation, T = real time, D = real distance, and S = real 
speed. Because Kosslyn, et al. do not speak in terms of real distance, 
but of representational distance, Pylyshyn concluded that images are 
therefore not analogic with real phenomena. Comments on the weakness 
of this_argument seem inappropriate. Let it be understood that equa-
tion l has never had any applicability to the real world as it fails to 
account for friction, slope, weight, etc. 
The argument that images must correspond exactly to external 
events and things has been termed the "picture-in-the-mind" view. This, 
of course, has been explicitly denied as reasonable by Kosslyn (1980). 
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Instead, many publications (Kosslyn & Shwartz, 1977; ·Paivio, 1971; 
Shepard et al., 1973, 1975) posit that images represent spatial infor-
mation by way of a second-order isomorphism. Because the surface 
representation does not preserve actual size, shape, orientation, and 
location information, it is also referred to as "quasi-pictorial". 
This view holds that images which occur in a surface representation are 
distinct from underlying encodings which lie in a deep representation. 
A quasi-pictorial spatial array, or the surface image, contains 
formatting parameters. These parameters are defined primarily by the 
visual buffer in which the subjectively experienced image is construct-
ed. The parameters of the visual buffer discussed here will be resolu-
tion, boundaries, and fade rate. 
Several of Kosslyn's (1975) experiments have focused on the 
resolution of the visual buffer. The typical experiment asks subjects 
to image scenes containing various sized animals. When asked questions 
about the animals, subjects took longer to answer when the images were 
small rather than large. The results of such studies support the 
notion that the visual buffer contains a limited resolution. If images 
or parts of images require a finer 'grain' for depiction than the reso-
lution parameter allows, they will suffer in form and clarity. 
Another of Kosslyn's series of experiments dealt with the maximum 
angle of the mind's eye and the spatial extent of the visual buffer 
(see Kosslyn, 1980, Chapter 3). The general method of these studies 
was as follows. People shut their eyes and formed a visual image of an 
object which was to be perceived as if it were at a distance. They 
then imagined that they were moving closer to the object until the 
image overflowed the image space. At this point, subjects estimated 
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the distance from themselves to the imagined object pretending as if 
the object were real. These subjective measures of size and proximity 
were finally used to estimate the angle of the mind's eye and thus the 
size of the visual buffer. Although Kosslyn's method of determining 
the boundaries of the visual buffer is subject to some criticisms 
(Weber, 1981; Hintzman, Note 4), it demonstrates two important points: 
images are constructed in a visual buffer, and this two-dimensional 
display area is a functional formatting medium with unique properties. 
The concept of a visual buffer upon which images are mapped is 
also supported by studies on the fade rate of images. There appears to 
be a limit on the number of parts that can be imaged at one time. Be-
cause of this limit, when people image a relatively complex scene, some 
parts appear to fade as the image is retained while other parts are 
either inserted or re-inserted into the image over time. 
Kosslyn (1975) reported an experiment which addressed this issue. 
People were to image animals next to an imaginary matrix. The matrix 
contained either four or sixteen cells. Subjects were asked to look 
for a part of the animal and if it was not present, to place it at the 
correct location. They were then asked to judge whether or not the 
test part fit on the image. Results showed that reaction times were 
higher for the sixteen cell matrix condition. These findings were used 
to support the claim that as images increase in complexity, more time 
is required to keep the image clearly mapped in the visual buffer. The 
assumption Kosslyn (1980) makes is that scanning and decision time in 
this type of task is a function of the time it takes to refresh parts 
of an image that have faded. 
The accounts given by Kosslyn on resolution, boundaries, and fade 
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rate of images are used here to provide a straightforward argument·for 
the existence of a visual buffer. The buffer is the me_dia through 
which formatted spatial displays are projected. A mind's eye witnesses 
(interprets) the spatial displays as if they occurred on the two-
dimensional screen of a CRT (Kosslyn, 1980). This metaphor of the CRT 
is a pivotal part of Kosslyn's theory and p+ovides the grounds for 
arguing that surfacing representations are different from deep repre-
sentations. This metaphor is supported by research and although in part 
abandoned, gave rise to a more detailed simulation of the imagery sys-
tem. 
The notion of images as second-order isomorphic displays on a 
visual buffer is crucial to studies of image transformation. In the 
present work it is assumed that images of stimuli are mapped out accord-
ing to the formatting principles discussed above. Especially in the 
image transformation condition of the present study, it is assumed that 
a mind's eye, located in a fixed position, interprets the analogic 
rotation.of images on a two-dimensional visual buffer. This view is not 
inconsistent with Kosslyn's who maintains that once a surface image is 
present, other processes, such as rotations, may be used (cf. Weber, 
1981) . 
Mental Maps 
Underlying the notion of adaptive behavior is the idea that our 
spatial ability is dependent upon possession of a cognitive map of our 
environment. Downs and Stea (1973) suggested that a cognitive map is a 
product of acquiring, interpreting, and storing information received 
from the environment. This section of Appendix B is concerned with the 
structure of cognitive maps, and their possible relation to mental 
images. 
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Trowbridge (1913) studied why people are apt to get lost in un-
familiar places. His speculations led him to believe that people are 
"ego-centric" with respect to orientation. In other words, people 
orient themselves primarily by means of a learned abstract coordinate 
system where dimensions are defined by compass points. Ego-centric 
orientation is always north/south and east/west in direction. Trow-
bridge asserts that when a person's body changes direction, a mental 
image or representation of the true compass dimensions is retained and 
used to maintain orientation. He called this stored information an 
"imaginary map". A test of a group of subjects who had imaginary maps 
revealed higher consistency in the ability to correctly orient them-
selves to true compass directions than subjects who had their cognitive 
maps disturbed. In other words, Trowbridge's subjects must have 
carried with them a mental spatial representation of the environment, 
and were able to use that representation of the environment to solve 
orientation problems. 
In a series of maze running experiments, Tolman (1948) argued that 
knowledge of the spatial environment is not simply the product of one-
to-one connections between stimuli and responses. Instead, he argued 
that this knowledge is derived from cognitive processing of stimuli and 
that the processed information is formatted into a cognitive map of the 
environment. To support this contention, Tolman related the story of 
one of Lashley's rats. This rat, after having learned an alley maze, 
pushed back the cover near the starting box and took a short-cut across 
to the food box. Tolman suggested that incidents such as Lashley's and 
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experiments along the same vein provide strong support for the idea 
that wide spatial maps contain more than specifically learned route 
information and .that these maps are available for problem solving. 
An experiment by Attneave and Farrar (1977) has very direct bear-
ing upon the question of whether or not cognitive maps involve mental 
imagery. In addition, the utility of the concept of a mind's eye is 
introduced. Attneave and Farrar were interested in questions concern-
ing the nature of our internal representation of the environment. 
Specifically, they wondered how people accurately maintain the status 
of objects that are outside the angular bounds of our visual system. 
Subjects in the experiment were individually exposed to a shelf holding 
seven objects (a pipe, a duck, a pencil, etc.). After studying these 
objects for some time, they were seated in a chair with their backs 
turned to the objects. One third of the subjects were to visualize the 
objects in front of them as if they were still looking at them. The 
second one-third of the subjects were to imagine the objects in their 
real positions behind them. The final third of the subjects were con-
trols who sat facing the objects although an opaque curtain prevented 
their full view. All subjects were asked questions concerning the spa-
tial arrangement of the objects. Results indicated that the three 
groups did not differe significantly. This result was attributed to 
large variances between subjects. Of primary interest are the results 
from the post-experiment questionnaire. All of the subjects who were 
to visualize the objects as if they were in front of them reported 
using a visual image to do so. The reports of the subjects who were to 
visualize the objects behind them were more inconsistent. One strategy 
was to mentally move all of the objects over the head so that a mirror 
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irrtage of the array was seen. Other subjects reported that they felt 
they had eyes in the back of their heads. These subjective results 
call to light the facility with which visual images of spatial environ-
mental relations can be rotated and transformed. More importantly, the 
authors acknowledge the phenomenon of the rotation of the mind's eye in 
cognitive mapping tasks. 
The phenomenon of movement of the mind's eye is the primary con-
cern of Jonides (1980) . Jonides was interested specifically in visual 
attention-shifting processes when the physical eye remained stationary. 
It was hypothesized that a sequential allocation model would account 
for shorter reaction times for subjects to locate targets as the target 
locations had a higher probability of being found. A forced-choice 
task measuring a cost-benefit effect was used to test the feasibility 
of an all-or-none resource allocation model of attention shifts. The 
experimental task required subjects to sit in a darkened room and 
examine briefly a string of eight letters. Subjects were to determine 
whether an upper case letter L or R was in the string. In the 'valid 
cue' trials an arrow pointer preceeded the display and correctly cued 
the location of the letter. On 'invalid cue' trials the pointer was 
misleading and indicated the position of a non-target letter. 'Neutral 
cue' trials had a diamond shaped pointer which was uninformative. Re-
sults indicated that valid cue trials were both faster and more accu-
rate than the invalid cue trials. As the percentage of valid cues in 
the total set of stimulus presentations decreased, the benefit derived 
from attending to valid cues decreased. At the same time, the cost of 
attending to invalid cues decreased. These decreases in costs and 
benefits occurred linearly over linear decreases in the percentage of 
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valid cues in the set. It was therefore concluded that the all-or-none 
model of resource allocation cannot be supported. In its place, 
Jonides offered a model of the mind's eye movement which contains 
parallel division of resources to parts of an array. He acknowledged 
that further tests are required which will distinguish between (a) 
whether division of resources is to all parts simultaneously, or (b) 
whether the benefits of cued locations is due to subjects mixing simul-
taneous and parallel allocation of resources. 
An important aspect of Jonides work on the movement of the mind's 
eye is in the connection between attentional resource allocation and 
cognitive maps. Cognitive maps apparently may be represented as spatial 
information in a visual buffer; that buffer includes a representation of 
space behind the head (Attneave and Farrar, 1977) as well as in front 
(see Kosslyn, et al.). Further, as Jonides indicated, shifts of atten-
tion may occur independent of eye movement. Consequently, movement of 
the mind's eye relative to a three-dimensional coordinate space becomes 
a plausible process in quasi-pictorial mental images of the environment. 
Summary and Conclusion 
Details concerning the structure and function of mental images re-
main unclear. Even so, in the past few years the clever work of some 
researchers (Kosslyn, 1975, 1980; Shepard, 1978; Paivio, 1971) has pro-
vided some answers. First, an image has been defined as a display or 
representation of spatial information in which some parallel processing 
may occur. Second, this display has properties which represent some of 
the salient features of the actual object or scene that is imaged. 
Because the representation does not preserve the actual size, complex-
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ity, etc. of the object, it is termed a second-order isomorphic repre-
sentation. Finally, the quasi-pictorial representation, as it has also 
been termed, may be constructed from propositional, or propositional-
like deep representations of information. Nevertheless, the surface 
image is itself a unique and functional cognitive phenomenon. 
The surface image is displayed through a functional formatting 
medium which contains definable parameters (Kosslyn, 1980). Some of 
those constants are: limited grain for resolution, limited size of the 
display area, and limited capacity or holding power. An important 
feature of this system is that processing of the surface representation 
normally occurs in a dimensional field out 'in front' of the mind's 
eye. Rotations of the image, such as those described by Cooper and 
Shepard (1973), are interpreted by a mind's eye which apparently remains 
at a fixed lccation. 
Structures and functions of mental maps are related to those of 
visual images. However, in contrast, mental maps are spatial repre-
sentations of information which do not necessarily adhere to the re-
strictions of a two-dimensional formatting medium out in front of the 
mind's eye (Attneave and Farrar, 1977). Rather, cognitive maps are 
spatial representations which indicate routes, paths, and environmental 
relationships (Tolman, 1948). Cognitive maps function like mental 
images in that they display spatial information in such a way that 
parallel processing may occur. This point is very important. The 
mind's eye can simultaneously observe the displayed spatial field while 
it moves to various areas of that field (Jonides, 1981). 
The theoretical similarities between mental images and mental maps 
are important for a number of reasons. (1) The visual buffer posited 
52 
by Kosslyn et al. (1977) may not always be restricted to a confined 
areainfront of the mind's eye. It may, in some cases, use a 360 degree 
three-dimensional field for formatting and displaying spatial informa-
tion. (2) In complex mind's eye movements through a cognitive map, 
parallel as well as sequential processing of information may occur 
(Hintzman, 1979). This suggests that a simple analog versus proposi-
tional argument on the structure of mental images may be naive. (3) 
The question arises as to the value of mental image transformation 
versus mind's eye transformation. Are there situations in which it is 
more expedient to use one or the other of these strategies to arrive 
at a functionally equivalent result? 
APPENDIX C 
INSTRUCTIONS 
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The instructions for the image transformation groups were as fol-
lows: 
You will be asked to form visual images of letters that are drawn 
on different sides of your head and then to change the image in some 
way. 
If I draw a lower case letter ~ on this glass (1 ft. square glass 
plate), sitting inside where you are now it looks like a £ to you, 
right? We call this way of looking at the letter, #1. Now if I turn 
the piece of glass this way (mirror image) what letter do you see? 
(A~.) We call this way of turning the letter, #2. If I took the let-
ter you see here and rotate it upside down, then what letter do you 
see? (A d.) We call this way of turning the letter,~· Finally, if I 
took this letter and turned it upside down and backwards like this, 
what letter does it become? (A b.) This way of turning the letter is 
called, !_±. 
Now let's go over this once again. 
process.) 
(Experimenter repeats the 
Now you take this piece of glass with the letter on it. I am go-
ing to tell you some of the code numbers and you turn the glass the 
right way. (The experimenter repeats a number of randomly picked code 
numbers until he feels that the subject has memorized them.) 
This experiment is concerned with how well you can form and then 
turn a visual image of letters. The letters will be drawn on different 
sides of your head with my finger. The letters that will be drawn on 
your skin will be p,q,b, and d. (The experimenter shows the subject 
these letters printed on a 5x8 white card.) The letters were drawn in 
the following manner. (The experimenter demonstrates this on the card. 
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All letters were drawn in one identical movement starting with the stem 
and ending with the loop.) 
I will be drawing these letters on your forehead (left side of 
your head) (experimenter points to his own forehead or left side of his 
head). I will ask you to close your eyes, then I will draw a letter on 
your head. At the same time that I draw the letter, I will tell you a 
number (1,2,3, or 4). Remember, the number tells you which way to turn 
your image of the letter. After I draw the letter and tell you the 
number, you turn your visual image of the letter and tell me what letter 
it looks like from its new position. Push this button at exactly the 
same time that you tell me the name of the letter. Do this as fast and 
as accurately as you can. Remember, this experiment is concerned with 
visual images, so please take as long a time as you need to keep a clear 
visual image of the letter. If you find it difficult to form the 
images and turn the letters, please let me know. 
Now let's try a few practice trials. Ask me any questions you 
wish. Ready? Close your eyes. 
The instructions for the mind's eye transformation groups were as 
follows: 
This experiment is concerned with visual images. You will be 
asked to form visual images of letters that are drawn on different 
sides of your head and then to look at those images from different per-
spectives. 
I want you to pretend that this figure lS you and that this piece 
of glass is the outside of your skin. (The experimenter shows the sub-
ject a 5x7 white card on which is drawn a human unisex figure.) If I 
draw this lower case letter ~on the glass, then with your head up and 
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standing inside like this what letter would the figure see? (A E·> Try 
to mentally move your body to the same orientation as the figure. We 
call this way of looking at the letter, #1. Now if I drew the same let-
ter on the glass, and you kept that letter in this position but you 
moved your body outside where the figure now is, with your head up, 
what letter would you see? Try to see it from the figure's viewpoint. 
(A~-> We call this way of looking at the letter, #2. If I drew the 
letter you see here and you were inside and upside down like this 
(demonstrate with the figure), what letter would you see? (A d.) We 
call this way of looking at the letter, #3. Finally, if I drew this 
same letter but you were outside where the figure is and you were upside 
down, what letter would you see? (A b.) This way of looking at the 
letter is called, #4. 
Now you take this figure. I am going to tell you some of the code 
numbers and you position the figure so that it is looking at the let-
ters the correct way. At the same time, mentally take the perspective 
of the figure yourself. (The experimenter repeats a number of randomly 
picked rotation code numbers until he feels that the subject has 
memorized them.) 
This experiment is concerned with how well you can move yourself 
mentally around a visual image of a letter that is fixed in one place 
(same as previous instructions) •.. Remember, the number tells you which 
way you are supposed to imagine yourself moving. After I draw the let-
ter and tell you the number, you imagine yourself moving to the right 
position and tell me what letter it looks like from your new position. 
Push this button at exactly the same time that you tell me the name of 
the letter. Do this as fast and as accurately as you can. Remember, 
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this experiment is concerned with visual images, so please take as ·long 
a·time as you need to keep a clear visual image of the ~etter as you 
move. If you find it difficult to form the images and move yourself 
around, please let me know. 
Now let•s try a few practice trials. Ask me any questions you 
wish. Ready? Close your eyes. 
APPENDIX D 
SUMMARY - ANALYSIS OF VARIANCE 
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Table 2 
Analysis of Variance Summary Table 
Source df MS F p < F 
Transformation 
Strategy (S) 1 699.41 38.61 .001 
Head Area (H) 1 26.66 1.47 
S X H 1 0.04 0.00 
Sex (G) 1 19.39 1.07 
S X G 1 0.16 1.01 
H X G 1 33.20 1.83 
S X H X G 1 18.16 1.00 
Error 1 
Subjects (S H G) 40 18.11 
Within Subjects 
Replications (R) 1 12.48 6.61 .05 
s X R 1 0.08 0.04 
H X R 1 0.006 0.00 
s X H X R 1 0.11 0.06 
G X R 1 12.03 6.38 .05 
s X G X R 1 8.70 4.61 .05 
H X G X R 1 6.61 3.50 
S X H X G X R 1 2.67 1.41 
Error 2 
R x Subjects (S H G) 40 1.89 
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Table 2 (Continued) 
Source df MS. F p < F 
Operation (0) 3 274.15 49.07 .001 
S X D 3 65.78 11.77 .001 
H X D 3 8.44 1.51 
S X H X D 3 1.45 0.26 
G X D 3 1.05 0.19 
S X G X D 3 0.26 0.05 
H X G X D 3 12.25 2.19 
S X H X G X D 3 7.53 1.35 
Error 3 
D x Subjects (S H G) 120 5.59 
R X D 3 4.09 2.07 
S X R X D 3 2.55 1.29 
H X R X D 3 8.23 4.17 .01 
S X H X R X D 3 6.07 3.08 .05 
G X R X D 3 4.44 2.25 
S X G X R X D 3 2.51 1.27 
H X G X R X D 3 2.94 1.49 
S X H X G X R X D 3 0.34 0.17 
Error 4 
R X D X Subjects (S H G) 120 1.97 
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